Oil and the origins of the
‘War to make the world safe for Democracy’
By F William Engdahl, 22 June, 2007
World Finance and Monetary Designs
after WW I
Montagu Norman and Benjamin Strong
By F. William Engdahl
“After 1914, under the guidance of a Morgan man, Benjamin Strong, first and, by far, the most powerful President in the history of the New York
Federal Reserve Bank, U.S. monetary policy and capital flows in the critical years up to 1929-1931, were, in effect, guided by the Bank of England under its head, Montagu Norman. The banking capital flows of
the twelve regional Federal Reserve banks were channeled into New York under Strong's influence.
It was a lop-sided domination by New York, opposite to the original
intent of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which envisioned a division of powers among the regional Federal Reserve districts and the Washington Reserve Board. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 had been passed by
Congress primarily to prevent the damaging effects of periodic banking panics such as in 1907, from causing broader domestic economic depressions.” more
Some unconventional reflections
on the Great Depression and the New Deal
By F. William Engdahl
It was fortunate for the historical legacy of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, that the initial military success of the Third Reich in Europe in 1939-1940, and the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 took attention away from his record in dealing with America’s Great
Depression. Had Roosevelt not ended his Presidency as a victorious war President, he would instead be remembered as the President whose policies all but ruined the inherent economic vitality of the American economy for decades after. more
Halford MacKinder's Necessary War
By F. William Engdahl, August 1998
"An iron-clad Swedish guarantee"
The dependence of the German steel industry on the Swedish iron ore was no small affair. By 1938, shortly before Hitler marched into Austria,
German steel production had tripled in tonnage from 1913, on the eve of the First World War. Ruhr steel mills depended on imported iron ore for almost three-quarters of their steel-making needs, and Sweden provided
more than 11 million tons of that in 1939 alone. After 1939, Sweden had to replace lost French iron ore as well. The economic inter-dependency between Swedish iron ore and German steel was strategic in every sense
. Without sufficient steel, no tanks would roll; the Luftwaffe would be without planes; no guns, no artillery, in short, all materiel required to execute a major war would lack. more